(Photo by ZUMA Press, Inc. via Agenzia Nova/CC 1.0 DEED)
When explosions began to echo through the capital city of Khartoum on April 15, 2023, Sudanese people’s worst fears were all but confirmed: a new phase of conflict had begun. The ensuing war has been commonly described as one waged between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and an unofficial citizen-led group known as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
Since early 2023, the United Nations estimates that the fighting has killed upwards of 150,000 people and displaced over 13 million. The war has often been described by politicians and media as a ‘civil war,’ ‘the forgotten war,’ or a war between tribes, religions, and ethnic groups. This is, perhaps, an oversimplification. Sudan has been a common site of international political maneuvering for decades. Not only have neighbouring countries such as Egypt, Chad, and Ethiopia been closely involved, but Saudi Arabia, China, Russia, and many global actors have been using Sudan to further their own policies.
A Fragmented State: The History of Sudan
Many contemporary accounts of the war in Sudan, such as this BBC overview or the UN Refugee Agency explainer, neglect to mention that Sudan was a British colony until 1956. Far from being an irrelevant historical detail, the British and Egyptian conquest brought together territories ruled by separate kingdoms and societies into one unit. Jointly ruled alongside Egypt, British administrators treated the Northern populations as elites. Education, economic investment, and political representation were all significantly higher in Sudan’s Northern territories. British rule thus created a legacy of inequality that lessened opportunities for populations in Sudan’s Southern regions.
Despite Britain’s preference to eventually rule the North and South separately, the two regions were suddenly unified following the Juba Conference of 1947. This pushed the South into a political system that was geared toward Northern domination. As the Republic of Sudan gained its formal independence in 1956, these inequalities carried over into the postcolonial era.
Identity in Sudan: Contemporary Context
The inequality that governed colonial rule left Sudanese people with little choice but to form political identities based on combinations of land, tribe, ethnicity, religion, and other affiliations. Since its independence, Sudan has experienced numerous coup d’états and several wars. While there were undoubtedly many factors that led to the First and Second Sudanese Civil Wars, they were notably fought in large part between the North and the South. This continuing dynamic ultimately resulted in the secession of Sudan’s southern region into its own country of South Sudan in 2011.
Massacres and war crimes in Sudan have occurred along religious, ethnic, and regional divisions. The civilian-led RSF soldiers traditionally draw their support from secular, Arab populations in the southwestern Darfur region and have systematically targeted ethnic Masalit people and other non-Arab minorities. While identities are important, it is crucial not to treat them as natural or inevitable; rather, they have been socially and politically defined as part of a process that dates back to the colonial era.
As noted by scholar Mahmood Mamdani, narratives that seek to describe Sudan as a site of deeply-held ethnic animosities “make no attempt to explain what leads to these atrocities.” Instead, he and other historians suggest that continued inequality and lack of political representation are the driving causes of Sudanese conflict.
International Responses & Responsibility for War in Sudan
The war in Sudan has been frequently referred to as ‘the forgotten war,’ both by locals on the ground as well as by journalists, international human rights organizations and politicians around the world. Political and media discourse has frequently and rightfully centered on the suffering of Sudanese populations caught in the middle of the conflict.
Whether intentionally or not, this broader discussion has downplayed the responsibility of international actors by referring to conflict solely as a ‘civil war.’ Sudan plays host to a complex web of international actors vying for control. In particular, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has been singled out for providing arms, drones, and other military support to the RSF. In exchange, groups allied with the RSF allow the UAE to extract gold, which is then smuggled into Dubai through countries such as Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Uganda.
The United States’ Secretary of State Marco Rubio has publicly criticized the United Arab Emirates for its role in supporting the RSF. He even went as far as to accuse the UAE of having committed genocide. This allegation is well-founded, as it is credibly supported by a number of investigations. However, the way in which this criticism has been leveraged is not as well-intentioned.
Rubio and other members of the U.S. Trump Administration have used UAE aid as a talking point to deflect attention away from Israel, arguing that Sudan is facing genocide while Gaza is not. This is in spite of credible evidence and UN consensus that Israel, with the help of funding from the U.S., is committing genocide against Palestinians in Gaza.
Not only this, but it is clear that while the U.S. is outwardly critical of the UAE, U.S. policy in Sudan stops short of action against it. Under Trump, the United States has redoubled its political and economic partnerships with the UAE and, by extension, the RSF. In doing so, the U.S announced sanctions against key officials in the Sudanese Armed Forces for their alleged promotion of ‘Islamism.’ Furthermore, the suspension of USAID funds in early 2025 has directly contributed to the rise of starvation and famine.
This pattern of condemnation without action is not exclusive to the United States. Many other countries, including France, Russia and the UK, publicly support the SAF while also maintaining close ties to the UAE and refusing to condemn their support for the RSF. The RSF’s participation in the peace process is directly at odds with its contemporary role as an internationally funded destabilizing force in Sudan. Without putting pressure on the Emirates, these countries inadvertently lend legitimacy to the RSF, granting them a presence in ceasefire negotiations and maintaining good relations with the UAE despite its complicity.
The Consequences of Misrepresenting Sudan
Many nations and popular journalism outlets seem not to understand how Sudan and its political system have been moulded by colonialism. This leads to misrepresentations that the conflict is a series of fundamental disagreements: between Muslims and secular Sudanese, between Arabs and ‘Africans,’ between tribes, or between two power-hungry generals that are beyond intervention.
Framing the war in Sudan in these ways or as merely a civil war allows stereotypical explanations of conflict, like the United States’ accusations of Islamism, to flourish and relieve international actors of responsibility. As nations continue to arm either side for their own political gain, Sudanese civilians suffer and see their desire for democracy go ignored.
The discourse surrounding Sudan ultimately betrays the democratic ideals of its revolution in 2019. Following a mass mobilization of civilians that overthrew longtime dictator Omar al-Bashir, Sudan’s military worked alongside the RSF to transition the country back to civilian governance. Now, Sudan is referred to as little more than the site of a “forgotten” civil war between various identity groups, without properly addressing the reasons why it has become convenient for it to be “forgotten.”
Hope for Sudan Moving Forward
Both colonial legacies and geopolitical manoeuvring have been active drivers of continued inequality and conflict. For a long-standing resolution in Sudan, advocacy must center on these two points. When discussing Sudan, highlighting the decades of division between North and South and how international actors have been involved in this process is crucial for creating a future with less politicization of identities and fewer power imbalances between different groups. Without doing so, the inequalities that exist will only continue, further denying the hopes and aspirations of Sudan’s 2019 revolution.
Edited by Melanie Miles
