(Photo by Zouzou Wizman via Flickr/CC BY 2.0 DEED)

Listen to this article:

https://spheresofinfluence.ca/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Sorrow-Tears-and-Blood_-An-Overview-of-Nigerias-Security-Crisis.mp3

On February 1, 2024, armed invaders stormed the palace of Oba Aremu Olusegun Cole, a traditional monarch in Kwara state in the southwestern region of Nigeria, killing him and kidnapping his wife and one other unnamed person. It was the third attack of its kind in a week after two other monarchs in a neighbouring state were killed just three days before.

Such attacks are not just targeted toward Nigerian royalty. In the first week of 2024 alone, over 380 people were kidnapped in the West African country. Nigeria continues to face multiple security challenges, from the terrorist insurgency in the north to socio-religious conflicts in the Middle Belt region, in addition to kidnapping concerns.

Insecurity as a Result of Rising Terrorism

Several militant groups are active in Nigeria, all of which have a significant impact on life in Nigeria and all of which the Nigerian government has failed to adequately address, from the Niger Delta Vigilantes to Biafran separatists and terrorists in northern Nigeria. More specifically, the Nigerian government has had to contend with Boko Haram, an Islamist fundamentalist terrorist organization that is also active in Chad, Niger, and northern Cameroon. 

Opposition to the imposition of “Western civilization” in northern Nigeria is a core belief of the group, as reflected in the group’s name, which can be loosely translated as “Western education is forbidden.” Resentment of colonialism, illiteracy, and a lack of economic opportunities for youth in northern Nigeria have also been highlighted by various individuals as underlying causes for the formation of the group. 

Boko Haram began their insurgency in 2009 once the group determined they were strong enough to fight against the Nigerian government. Boko Haram’s frequent attacks against the police, Nigeria’s armed forces, and civilians have resulted in the deaths of more than 300,000 people.

Boko Haram’s attacks consist of suicide bombings, as well as conventional armed assaults on both civilian and military targets. Following the Chibok kidnapping of 276 girls in 2014, the majority of Boko Haram’s suicide bombers are now women, and many of them teenagers. Boko Haram members also rely on stealth, often blending into local communities after threatening them or enticing them with the promise of money and other economic benefits.

Claims from the federal government in 2016 that Boko Haram has been “technically defeated” were met with doubt and disbelief from various international organizations like Amnesty International, among others. Indeed, the terrorist organization and its splinter group, the Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP), continue to wreak havoc on communities in Northern Nigeria, Cameroon, and Niger.  

For example, in January 2024, ISWAP reportedly increased the intensity of its attacks, carrying out at least 54 attacks under the slogan “kill them wherever you find them,” a distorted reference to the Quran. 

The Finances of Kidnapping

According to SMB Intelligence, a Nigerian risk consultancy firm, about 3,620 people were kidnapped in the country between July 2022 and June 2023, with a total ransom demand of over 5 billion naira (approximately CAD 4.5 million). The numbers for the period between July 2021 and June 2022 read similar: about 3,360 people were abducted.

This statistic is perhaps best underlined by the recent kidnapping of Nabeeha Al-Kadriyar, an undergraduate student at Ahmadu Bello University in Kaduna State, Nigeria. After attention was drawn to her kidnapping in Abuja due to the proximity to the nation’s capital, a crowdfunding attempt to raise the ransom, and her subsequent killing, there was nationwide condemnation, including from Nigeria’s First Lady, Remi Tinubu.

Nabeeha, her father, and her sisters were kidnapped on January 2nd by unknown gunmen who demanded a ransom of 60 million naira (CAD 55,000 at the time of writing) for their release by January 12th. When they did not receive the requested money, Nabeeha was killed, presumably as a show of the kidnappers’ will and intent.

Despite efforts to put an end to kidnappings across the country, the Nigerian government has not had much success. A policy proposed to link National Identity Numbers (NIN) with SIM cards, aimed at connecting ransom demand-related phone calls to specific individuals and reducing kidnappings, has been unsuccessful.

Climate Change and Its Role in Nigeria’s Ethnic and Religious Clashes 

Nigeria’s Middle Belt region, comprising states like Plateau, Niger, and Kwara, has long been viewed as the division line between northern and southern Nigeria. Unfortunately, this region has become a hotbed of violent ethno-religious conflicts, largely between Fulani Muslim cow herders and Christian farmers.  

The destruction of crops by grazing cows has often resulted in recurring conflict across the region. On one hand, farmers say their attacks are to protect their traditional farmlands from crop and land damage that are synonymous with grazing cows. On the other hand, attacks from cow herders are often framed as retaliation or self-defence. Farmers have also stated on multiple occasions that they fear these attacks are merely an exercise in land-grabbing by the herders themselves.

Climate change has also led to a worsening of the issue. With fast-changing weather patterns and rapid desertification, pastoralists are finding it harder to return to their usual foraging ground. As a result, they are migrating lower into Sub-Saharan Africa, areas with already established communities, making conflict almost inevitable. A dwindling supply of water and other resources in northern Nigeria has also led to increased conflict, reportedly extending to southwestern Nigerian states like Ondo and Oyo.

As the proverb goes, when two elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers. In this case, regardless of the underlying reasons or cause of the conflict, the residents of the Middle Belt have been killed and displaced in large numbers. More recent numbers are difficult to ascertain but as of 2021 (and since 2018), over 300,000 people have been displaced and almost 2,000 have died because of these clashes.

While state governors in western Nigeria have tried to stem the ethnic conflicts through the creation of local police forces called Amotekun, state and local police forces, the federal government has not been completely cooperative, initially insisting that policing remains a federal responsibility. As a result, efforts to reduce these conflicts have been duplicated without necessarily resulting in positive gains. 

Reaching a State of Security

Although Nigeria has had some success in the past with coordinated attacks against Boko Haram and the use of amnesty to de-radicalize some militants, the recent increase in attacks within the country has begun to call into question the efficacy of the country’s national security policies. Before the uptick in attacks in 2021, the number of killings attributed to Boko Haram had been on a decline since 2015.

Additionally, while several countries in West Africa (Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Benin) have come together to form the Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram and similar terrorist groups, the moderate success that the coalition has enjoyed by sharing intelligence and coordinating attacks against Boko Haram has been marred by claims of corruption and a failure by the involved states to fully cooperate where necessary. In 2012, then-President Goodluck Jonathan admitted that members of Boko Haram had succeeded in gaining sympathizers in various government bodies and security outfits.

Rooting out corruption was supposedly a major goal of the last administration, but Nigeria remains one of the most corrupt countries in the world. Any attempt to put an end to Boko Haram’s reign of terror in northern Nigeria must first identify their sympathizers in all levels of government and strip them of all influence.  

In areas where Boko Haram acts as a de facto government, it can often promise better economic opportunities than the federal or state government through crimes like rustling cattle and kidnapping. In places where this promise is not enough to entice the indigenes, threats (and acts) of violence are often used to recruit new members.

In re-establishing security in Nigeria, all levels of government must come together to make sure their presence is felt at all levels. Rural areas of the country cannot be left to the control of kidnappers and religious extremists, as this has the effect of creating a never-ending supply of recruits for various criminal elements.

One such attempt has been the creation of Amotekun, to combat kidnapping and increased violent attacks in southwestern Nigeria. Continued collaboration among southwestern states and decentralization of Nigeria’s security outfits promise greater benefits for all Nigerians. However, the federal government’s initial reluctance to integrate these forces has hampered the realization of their full potential.

Interconnected Solutions

All of the aforementioned issues, from kidnapping, Boko Haram, and conflict in the Middle Belt, are interconnected. As such, the solutions to these issues must have some level of interconnectivity. As an example, Boko Haram has employed kidnapping as a fundraising tool to fund the purchase of weapons and some worry that the conflict in the Middle Belt is partly sponsored by Boko Haram. For example, improving the implementation of linking NINs to cell phones with local police support would enhance tracking and identification of crime perpetrators.

Additionally, future attempts to address Boko Haram and herder-farmer conflicts must consider climate change’s ongoing role in triggering these conflicts. Designating specific grazing zones for herders and imposing strict penalties for grazing on farming land can go a long way to minimize bloodshed. Moreover, the strict implementation of government guidelines and laws is essential to prevent farmers from taking matters into their own hands when conflicts arise. 

Finally, looking beyond the enforcement aspect of security, economic development must be emphasized. As mentioned above, a lack of economic opportunities has often been cited as one reason for the attraction to illicit money-making schemes. Social welfare initiatives like the N-Power are a good start. However, the government must continue to seek to target more impoverished youths, especially those at risk of being taken advantage of by the aforementioned terrorists and kidnappers. Additionally, all levels of government must make sure the economic opportunities of their citizens are not limited to crime and terrorism by expanding current measures like the Government Enterprise and Empowerment Program (GEEP). 

Since returning to democracy in 1999, successive Nigerian presidents have failed to deal with insecurity in the country. Newly elected President, Bola Ahmed Tinubu won the country’s most recently concluded election with a platform that promised security for everyone. With an increasingly weak economy, Nigeria’s newly elected government must swiftly ensure security for its citizens or risk further descent into chaos.

Edited by Chelsea Bean & Light Naing

Dami Fakolujo

A Nigerian-Canadian immigrant, Dami Fakolujo is a recent graduate of the Master of Arts program at Carleton University. His interests include security, defense, international institutions, and secession,...