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Restrictions are being increased on ethnic Russians in Latvia, raising tensions within the country and straining the country’s already tense relationship with Russia. In Fall 2022, the Latvian government revised their immigration law to make Russian citizens wanting to continue living in Latvia pass a basic Latvian proficiency test. Those who fail to pass this language test face deportation back to Russia. Meanwhile, Russian tourists with no legal status in Latvia are banned from entering the country until March 2025. The entry ban has been justified on national security grounds, stemming from Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. 

Latvia has also taken steps to limit the influence of the Russian language within the country. Before 2022, the Latvian government allowed school education to be taught in Russian. Government legislation, however, has been passed to make Latvian the only language of schooling by September 2025. This policy has been part of wider de-Russification efforts taken since Russia’s invasion, including the dismantling of Soviet-era monuments that have long served as a historical link between Latvia and Russia.

These actions have not been without criticism. U.N. experts argue that Latvia’s new policies may bring discrimination against human rights; some Latvian politicians also consider these policies unclear and divisive. In particular, opposition politicians have used this situation to gain support and challenge the government’s policies. As it currently stands, Russians make up a quarter of the total population. Yet, many Russians in Latvia, especially those who have lived in Latvia all their lives, have become increasingly worried about their future in the country.

Why is Latvia Doing This?

The catalyst for Latvia’s most recent wave of policies was Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. As one of Ukraine’s fiercest supporters, Latvia’s government has taken a tough stance against Russia, calling its actions in Ukraine genocide and declaring Russia a ”state-sponsor of terrorism.” Latvia’s attack on the Russian language has been part of a wider goal of lessening any cultural and historical ties Russia may still have in Latvia. For many countries in the post-Soviet space, Russia only serves as a daily reminder of the painful years they had to suffer under Soviet rule. The removal of Soviet monuments, meanwhile, is a way for Latvia to move past its history of occupation and solidify its independent national identity.

Local Latvians have rallied behind the new policies. They believe that Russians in the country had plenty of time to learn Latvian, which remains the only official language in the country. Yet, many Russians, especially those who grew up in the Soviet Union, speak little to no Latvian. Some residents of mostly Russian-speaking parts of the country have gone decades without knowing the language. Velta, a resident of Liepāja, said: “We are in Latvia. We needed this for a long time. Where is the problem? We do know Russian, although we do not live in Russia.” And so far, the new legislation seems to be taking root. Thousands of Russians in the country have already lined up to take the test, with many others signing up for language courses. 

Russian media, on the other hand, has been banned because of its openly biased propaganda regarding the war in Ukraine. Nine Russian websites, many of which justified Russian war crimes in Ukraine, were also shut down. The Latvian Council for Electronic Mass Media has stated that the ban is necessary to cut down Russian-state narratives and stop the spread of hateful and intentionally misleading information. It is just the first step, however. The goal is to ban any content being broadcasted in Russian by 2026

Why Latvia’s Government Should Reconsider Its Approach

Targeting a quarter of your population with policies limiting their language rights is not a recipe for encouraging a united society. These policies will likely separate the Russian community from the rest of the Latvian population. This division is particularly noticeable in Daugavpils, Latvia’s second-largest city, where around half the residents are ethnic Russians. Compared to most Latvians, Daugavpils residents have preferred parties that strongly criticize Western-leaning policies and support closer ties to Russia. Shrinking the use of Russian in a city where virtually everyone speaks may work to increase public appeal for these parties soon.

Latvia’s government should find a way to bridge the language barrier in a way that does not separate Russians from the rest of Latvia. As an EU member, these policies do not reflect well on the values the alliance upholds. In February 2024, the Council of Europe’s Advisory Committee, which handles “the protection of national minorities,” published an opinion report outlining its concerns about Latvia’s measures towards the Russian language. Although the Committee acknowledged Latvia’s legitimate security concerns caused by the war in Ukraine, Latvia’s new policies “led to undue restrictions in the rights of the Russian national minority.”

While banning Russian media outlets might make sense in light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, including fighting the spread of Russian propaganda targeted toward Latvian society, this too may backfire. No matter the source, banning all content in Russian prevents Russians in Latvia from hearing alternative narratives which may go directly against Putin’s narrative. Russians will have to resort to illegal means to watch Russian state channels since they will likely not be able to understand Latvian. The government should instead consider Estonia’s approach to the issue of language use in public media. Instead of banning all Russian content, Estonia’s Ministry of Culture hoped to draw Russians away from Russian war propaganda by producing alternative content in Russian. 

Fueling Putin’s Justifications for Intervention

Latvia’s approach to ethnic Russians living in the country also serves to fuel Putin’s rhetoric about the treatment of ethnic Russians abroad. Although in entirely different contexts, Russia has used the protection of Russians and Russian speakers abroad as an excuse for launching military invasions. Think Ukraine in 2014 and Georgia in 2004. Latvia, like Ukraine and Georgia, is not responsible for ‘oppressing’ its Russian population. Yet, these new policies still serve as a baseline that Putin may use to build upon as justification for any potentially aggressive actions against Latvia. Whether it was Latvia’s intentions or not, the government’s actions may eventually strengthen Putin’s narrative. He will use this current situation in Latvia to gain increased support for his policies abroad. 

For this reason, Latvia’s new policies may have been too soon and harsh. Latvia has the right to solidify its own national identity, especially given the horrible history it had to go through as a part of Soviet Russia. Latvia also has the right to promote its language and culture. Yet, policymakers should consider another approach to achieving this goal that does not separate ethnic Russian residents from Latvian society even further. If the Latvian government wants to produce Western-oriented citizens who shy away from Putin’s narrative, it may want to use carrots and not sticks as a method. Estonia’s example of promoting media literacy would be a better option.

Edited by Ashley Renz

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Joel Perriard

Joel grew up in various countries around the world, but it was in Odessa, Ukraine, where he first found his interest in international affairs, having personally witnessed the effects of the Maidan revolution...