(Photo by The U.S. National Archives via PICRYL/PDM 1.0 DEED)
On June 23, 2025, Iran launched 19 ballistic missiles at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, the largest U.S. military base in the Middle East. Tehran claimed the attack was retaliation for the bombing of three Iranian nuclear facilities.
Fortunately, no U.S. service members were injured, and out of the 19 missiles launched by Iran, only one penetrated Qatar’s air defences and struck the base. While the Qatari military deserves credit for blunting Iran’s retaliation by intercepting most of the missiles, Iran had telegraphed the attack well in advance by notifying both the United States and Qatar beforehand.
The Strike was Met with Regional Outrage
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) denounced the attack on Al Udeid, expressing its “deep regret and strong condemnation” of Iran’s attack on the U.S. military base, adding that the strike was a “blatant, unacceptable, and dangerous” violation of Qatar’s sovereignty.
Qatar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson, Dr. Majed bin Mohammed Al Ansari, also expressed his country’s strong condemnation of the strike and affirmed that Qatar reserves the right to respond to Iran’s “brazen aggression” in accordance with International law.
Saudi Arabia was especially indignant, stating that the attack was “a flagrant violation of international law and the principles of good neighbourliness, and an entirely unacceptable act that cannot be justified under any circumstances.”
Iran’s Attack on Al Udeid was Unexpected
While regional actors had expected Tehran’s symbolic retaliation against U.S. assets in the Middle East, its choice of target was not. Rather than targeting U.S. bases in Syria or Iraq, as many analysts had expected, Iran chose to target a U.S. base in the Gulf. The attack on Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar was a strategic mistake by Iran, which has not been able to claim credit for many diplomatic wins in recent years, except for its improved relations with Gulf states. Iran’s attack will force Gulf leaders to reconsider the worthiness of reconciliation with the regime in Tehran.
Iran was already harvesting the fruits of reconciliation with the Gulf, as demonstrated by how Gulf states reacted to Israel’s recent large-scale attacks on Iran.
Saudi Arabia led the charge, stating that the kingdom “expresses its strong condemnation and denunciation of the blatant Israeli aggressions against the brotherly Islamic Republic of Iran.” Riyadh’s statement was significant, as it marked a considerable departure from the comments made by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) seven years ago. During a 2017 interview with MBC Television, the crown prince characterized the Iranian regime as “a regime built on an extremist ideology … which [says] they must control the land of Muslims and spread their Twelver Jaafari sect in the Muslim world.” Meanwhile, Qatar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly condemned Israel’s attack on Iran, noting that it was “a blatant violation of Iran’s sovereignty and security, as well as a clear breach of international law and its established principles.”
A shift to a more friendly tone towards Iran was not the only tangible change that Reconciliation brought to the foreign policy of GCC countries. Notably, Gulf states supported the latest round of nuclear negotiations with Tehran, viewing diplomacy as a viable path to regional stability. The support that Gulf countries lent to renewed nuclear negotiations with Iran represents a significant departure from their earlier stance. During the first Trump administration, states like Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE actively lobbied the president to abandon the Obama-era nuclear deal and adopt a maximum pressure strategy towards Iran.
Why Did the Gulf States Opt for Reconciliation with Iran?
The shift in policy among Gulf countries toward Tehran was not spontaneous. Gulf leaders opted for reconciliation after years of escalating hostilities with Iran that destabilized the region and pushed U.S.-Gulf defence relations to their limit.
One of the most significant events prompting this reconciliation was the drone attack on Saudi oil installations at Abqaiq, which took place on September 14, 2019. Iranian-backed Houthi militants claimed responsibility for the strike, which temporarily shut down half of Saudi Arabia’s oil production. The strike exposed the vulnerability of Saudi energy infrastructure to Iranian weaponry and put Saudi-U.S. defence relations to the test.
Riyadh had expected a decisive U.S. response to what it viewed as an Iranian-sponsored attack on its sovereignty. However, the kingdom received a lukewarm reaction from U.S. President Donald Trump, who proclaimed that he had not “promised” to protect Saudi Arabia, adding that he would “sit down with the Saudis and work something out.”
The insufficient support that Saudi Arabia received from the United States, along with the unfruitful Gulf intervention in Yemen against the Iranian-backed Houthis, highlighted the high costs of continued antagonism with Iran. Consequently, Gulf countries sought better relations with Tehran, viewing rapprochement as more beneficial to their stability than maintaining a state of antagonism.
The Gulf States Limited U.S. Operational Capabilities in the Region
Since the outbreak of recent hostilities between the United States and Iran, Gulf states have made staying out of the conflict their top priority. In a bid to avoid becoming targets for Iran’s attacks, they have prohibited U.S. aircraft from using their airfields or airspace to launch strikes against Iran. The rationale behind this policy was clear: by staying out of the conflict, Gulf leaders believed they could avoid provoking Tehran and thereby remain outside its crosshairs.
However, Iran’s recent missile strike on the Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar has shattered such illusions. Even though the seven B-2 Spirit bombers involved in the attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities departed from Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri, not from any U.S. base in the Gulf, Iran nonetheless retaliated against a U.S. base on Qatari soil. While Tehran has struggled to enforce many of its declared red lines due to a lack of capability, it has succeeded in one significant area: limiting the United States’ operational flexibility in the Gulf.
Iran’s Attack Will Force the Gulf States to Reevaluate Their Defence Doctrine
The strike on Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar has brought to light a troubling reality for Gulf leaders: even full compliance with Tehran’s red lines does not guarantee immunity from Iranian attacks. In search of a more effective defence against Iran, Gulf states may begin to view a stronger U.S. footprint on their soil as a credible deterrent worth reconsidering. Additionally, GCC countries may increase their military spending to counter Iranian aggression. Both of these developments run counter to the Iranian regime’s interest, as it has actively sought to limit U.S. operational capabilities in the Gulf and reduce tensions with Gulf states.
Beyond causing damage to its credibility among Gulf States, the attack on Al Udeid Air Base also failed to achieve Iran’s own objectives. The strike failed to reestablish deterrence, as the U.S.-made Patriot Missile defence system easily intercepted the majority of Iran’s missiles. Moreover, by telegraphing its attack, Tehran has shown its hand, indicating that it does not seek confrontations with the United States, as it is not ready for one.
Following the attack on Al Udeid, Qatar’s Prime Minister, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani, stated: “What happened will definitely have its scar on the relationship (with Iran), but I hope by the time everyone learns the lesson that this kind of neighbourhood relationship should not be violated and should not be undermined.”
While Iranian-Gulf relations are by no means irreparable following the strike on Al Udeid, Tehran’s attack significantly damaged its credibility among Gulf states, which may now question the wisdom of respecting Iran’s red lines if doing so still leaves them open to Iranian aggression.
Edited by Chelsea Bean
