(Photo by Dotun55 via Wikimedia Commons/CC BY-SA 4.0)
In late October 2025, an Al-Qaeda linked terrorist group, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), claimed responsibility for an attack on soldiers in Kwara state in central Nigeria. The attack was the first of its kind by this group in Nigeria; typically, it operates in neighbouring countries such as Benin, Mali, and Burkina Faso. Nonetheless, it highlights a significant growth in power and destructive capacity for a group formed only in 2017.
JNIM is just one of several Al-Qaeda aligned regional groups around the world that are growing in influence and power after the gradual and targeted deterioration of the organization’s central power. Examples of other groups include Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al-Shabaab (active in Somalia), and JNIM (active in the Sahel). Although the Islamic State group and its affiliates remain the world’s deadliest terrorist group in 2024, Al-Qaeda affiliated groups are a significant factor in the African continent becoming the epicenter for terrorism.
Profile of Al-Qaeda’s Regional Affiliates
JNIM was formed as a result of a coalition between several regional Islamist groups in 2017 and pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda at the same time. Since then, the group has been responsible for 1,454 deaths across 146 attacks in 2024. This makes the group the second-deadliest terrorist organisation worldwide for the year. Of the countries it operates in, the group caused 322 deaths in Mali, 109 in Niger, and 41 in Togo.
Of particular note is the ongoing siege of Bamako, the Malian capital, by JNIM. Since late September, members of the group have reportedly sealed off major highways into Bakamo, creating an economic and fuel blockade as inhabitants rapidly run out of fuel and necessities.
Ansaru, another Al-Qaeda affiliate, is primarily based in Nigeria and splintered from Boko Haram after disagreements with the leadership over the targeting of fellow Muslims and civilians in their terrorist attacks. After initial attacks in Northern Nigeria, the group’s activities in the region largely declined between 2013 and 2020. Nonetheless, over the last 5 years, the group has restarted operations, with noted collaborations with JNIM as the latter continues to expand in the region.
Al-Shabaab began as part of the moderate youth military arm of the Islamic Courts Union in Ethiopia in the early 2000s but became more radical after the Ethiopia-led invasion of the country in 2006. After repelling the invasion, these courts started to fill the governance void left by an unstable Somali government, playing key judicial and executive roles.
Since 2008, the group has become more ideologically aligned with Al-Qaeda, moving from an Islamist Somalia-focused group towards seeing an Islamist state in Somalia as one of many provinces/affiliates under Al-Qaeda. In 2025, Al-Shabaab intensified its attacks against the Somali government, and is functioning as the de facto government in places that the Somali government had previously liberated. The group’s resurgence also stems from its ability to capitalize on clan disunity and the Somali government’s broken promises.
The Enemy of My Enemy is My Affiliate
Since the split of the Islamic State from Al-Qaeda in 2016, affiliates of both terrorist groups have continued to clash over resources and differing ideological beliefs. The most prominent clash in sub-Saharan Africa occurs between JNIM and the Islamic State – Sahel Province where both groups have resumed hostilities after several attempts at a truce.
Ansaru is rivalled in West Africa by the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and has recently resurfaced after several years of underground presence. This “comeback” has been fueled by Ansaru’s new tactics, which reportedly include exploiting Fulani grievances to its advantage and recruiting people who feel disadvantaged by the wider governance structure. Within this dynamic, ISWAP remains the dominant group, carrying out more attacks and even recruiting former Ansaru members.
In Somalia, competition between Al-Shabaab and the Islamic State in Somalia Province (ISSP) continues to wage on, despite the former’s superiority in terms of numbers and finances. Al-Shabaab is reported to have approximately 10,000 fighters, compared with ISSP’s latest numbers of fewer than 2,000 members. Al-Shabaab also reportedly controls a larger geographical location than ISSP does and is reportedly encircling Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital.
Battles are often fought between these groups for influence and resources, with devastating effects on nearby civilian populations. Additionally, some of these groups often pledge allegiance to Al-Qaeda for the benefits they might reap for doing so, without necessarily sharing belief in their ideologies.
Notably, in recent years, these groups have become increasingly financially independent, no longer completely relying on Al-Qaeda for funding. This phenomenon can be explained by the fact that while Al-Qaeda has diminished in power and influence, affiliates like Al-Shabaab have only grown in the same. Additionally, it highlights that these groups are more than just local extensions of groups like Al-Qaeda; they often have their own financial systems and organizations and are somewhat independent in their decision-making.
In the Beginning was a Vacuum
For many of these groups, a vacuum and a lack of strong institutions have allowed them to proliferate within their respective regions. A lack of credible governance allowed Al-Shabaab to become the dominant force in Southern and Central Somalia. In the same vein, a continued lack of economic opportunities and a dysfunctional government structure continue to make membership in groups like JNIM and Ansaru attractive to the communities they rule. This is especially true for unemployed youth who are more likely to face pressure to join these groups for protection and employment. Ethnic/religious minorities also encounter unique challenges as they face the increased likelihood of attacks in the jostle for resources in these regions.
Additionally, shifting geopolitical alliances have also affected the resurgence of these groups. The withdrawal of European and Russian anti-terrorism forces in Mali and Burkina Faso has emboldened groups like JNIM to look to increase their influence in the region. Military-controlled countries like Mali and Burkina Faso insisted on the removal of European countries and sought to replace their counter-terrorism efforts with Russian troops. Unfortunately, Russian-controlled forces have increasingly been redeployed to the warfront of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, leaving a vacancy that groups like JNIM have moved quickly to fill.
Beyond the extremist ideology these groups spout, the use of cattle rustling, abductions, and other crimes for fundraising is also connected to the lack of dependable governing structures. These groups can commit wanton crimes due to an absence of dependable law enforcement, with reports of some members of law enforcement and military helping these terrorist groups.
Say No to Terrorism
Recently, the president of the United States of America, Donald Trump, has made claims regarding an alleged genocide of Christians in Nigeria. In truth, the increase in Christian deaths in countries like Nigeria is partly because of the resurgence in terrorist activity across the region. While the countries in sub-Saharan Africa have had some success in pushing back against these terrorist groups, their recent resurrection highlights the need to find better solutions.
Closer coordination is needed between countries that are currently being terrorised by these groups. Although there are some ideological cracks between Russia-aligned countries, Western-aligned countries, and neutral countries, countries like Burkina Faso and Mali must put aside ideological differences to ensure better coordination in the fight against the various terrorist groups.
Additionally, the threat or use of invasions against sub-Saharan countries will not result in better outcomes against groups like JNIM. Proof for this can be found in the endless wars that have been continuously fought in the war against terror. Intensified coordination is a better route, especially given its prior positive results.
The coordinated fight against terrorism described here is not just physical; efforts to track the flow of money between Al-Qaeda and its affiliates must be intensified and utilised correctly. Their methods of financing must be stopped at the source as well; proper policing structures and local integration with communities will go a long way in restoring trust between military personnel and the very people they seek to protect.
Stability is also needed in the region. The coup trap that is prevalent in the Sahel is a contributing factor to the growing power of these organisations. A lack of a stable government capable of protecting and providing for its citizens creates a vacuum that groups like JNIM can exploit.
Steady and credible democratic governments are needed to create long-standing institutions, and military governments like Burkina Faso’s must keep their promise of a peaceful transition to democracy. With stability comes more economic opportunities, which can further ensure that fewer people are drawn to the “opportunities” these groups provide.
Edited by Atena Abbaspourbenis
