(Photo by NATO via Flickr/CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)
On June 25, 2025, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Republic of Rwanda signed an agreement, brokered by the United States of America, to put an end to the ongoing conflict between the two Central African countries.
The conflict between the countries restarted in 2022 after Rwandan forces reportedly began providing support to Congolese rebels in their struggle to cause the destabilisation of the Congolese gtovernment. Prior attempts to resolve the conflict have failed to bring lasting peace, and questions remain over whether this deal will provide the long-sought solution for all involved parties. The current conflict has its roots in prior hostilities and the colonialism carried out by King Leopold II and the Belgian state.
Prior to the signing of the deal, Rwanda accused the DRC of offering support to rebel groups like the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) while the DRC accused Rwanda of doing the same with groups like the March 23 Movement (M23).
The conflict has resulted in thousands of casualties, with hundreds of thousands more refugees. Civilians in the Kivu region, for example, are continuously affected by the raging conflict as the M23 continues to gain control of the region and its numerous natural resources.
Those Who Cannot Remember the Past
M23 began in 2012 as a breakaway group from the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The name of the group was derived from the 2009 signature date of an integration treaty that united various Tutsi militant groups, such as the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), into the military and civil society.
After gaining independence in 1960 from the harsh rule of King Leopold II and the Belgian state, the Democratic Republic of Congo has endured further hardships as a result of colonization, military rule, as well as both internal and external conflict.
For example, the First and Second Congo wars caused a combined 5.4 million deaths in the Central Africa region. Events like the Rwandan genocide, which resulted from Belgium’s colonization, partly caused these numbers of deaths.
Hutu-led genocide against the Tutsis in Rwanda led to widespread conflict between the governments of Rwanda and DRC (and their respective allies) as some Hutu leaders fled to the neighbouring DRC and did not get sent back despite demands to do so from Rwanda. With the DRC’s refusal to hand over members of the Interahamwe, who later formed members of the FDLR, came the First and Second Congo Wars.
The Interahamwe are a Hutu militia group that spearheaded the mass killing of Tutsi civilians (and moderate Hutus) during the Rwandan genocide of 1994. They continue to operate in the DRC after fleeing there towards the end of the Rwandan Genocide.
Since the end of the Second Congo War in 2003, rebel groups like M23 and FDLR have continued to wage war against each other and the Congolese and Rwandan governments (respectively), with frequent fluctuations between moments of active insurgency and attempts at peacemaking.
After the failed integration of groups like the CNDP into the military and civil society, M23 mutinied in 2012 and restarted the struggle against the Congolese government at several points. Indeed, despite an agreement on a ceasefire in 2013, the rebellion restarted in 2022 as M23 seized control of large amounts of territory in Eastern Congo.
The Art of the Deal
Per several media sources, the deal signed by Rwanda and the DRC aims to end the crisis in eastern Congo while providing access to various rare materials in the region for the government of the United States and their companies. However, the juxtaposition of ending a deadly conflict while enabling access to raw materials raises several questions about the true intent of this deal.
Is the ending of the conflict just another avenue for American neocolonialism and the draining of critical materials from Rwanda and the DRC? In particular, as the United States continues pursuing a foreign policy of “America First”, does its involvement in this deal actually benefit Rwanda and the DRC?
The deal lays out a clear benefit for the United States. Upon signing this deal, both DRC and Rwanda are obligated to cooperate on joint ventures concerning their critical mineral supply chains, in partnership with the United States and its investors. Even if both countries are duly compensated for their participation, it is an undue reward to the United States for facilitating this deal, especially as matters on the ground have not substantially changed since the deal was signed.
Nonetheless, for both Central African countries, there is an obvious benefit. The treaty asserts that neither nation is to engage in or support attacks by third parties on the other. Ideally, this would mean an end to material support for the FDLR and M23. The end of the conflict would mean a significant reduction in atrocities committed against both countries’ respective populations.
Other benefits include (hopefully, responsible) investment from the United States government and its partners, in addition to peace across the region. Despite this, an America First foreign policy raises significant questions on how these countries’ will align with American interests and how non-alignment will impact these investments.
Not Good Enough
The conflict in Central Africa has intensified with Rwanda’s direct intervention in 2022. As such, it is also important to make sure groups like M23 and the FDLR, with the role they have played in increased violence in the region, are full participants in any peace talks.
The inclusion of these groups in these talks is especially relevant as allegations of support for the M23 group and its atrocities continue to surround the Rwandan government, particularly as officials within the regime have continued to make territorial claims on “historical Rwandan lands.” Furthermore, the Rwandan government has reportedly benefited from the sale of natural resources mined in M23-controlled areas.
On the other side of the conflict, institutions like the Human Rights Watch continue to assert that the DRC is offering secret material support (weapons and money) for the FDLR and other militia groups in their campaign against the M23, thus effectively against the Rwandan government as well. The allegations of governmental support outlines the importance of groups like these and why their absence is so glaring. If a party like the M23 has yet to sign onto the deal, will the lack of outright support from Rwanda be enough to end their participation in the conflict?
Although M23 is reportedly currently in separate discussions with Qatar for their own version of a peace agreement, there have been no indications so far that they will stop the fighting. Even without continued support from Rwanda, M23’s potential continued involvement in the conflict will only continue to hurt people across the region.
Better is Possible
The deal between the DRC and Rwanda covers a lot of ground, from ending the conflict to establishing possible future investments in the minerals of both countries. However, the deal leaves certain areas of concern unaddressed.
For example, there is no mention of justice for people who have been affected by the actions of the Rwandan and Congolese governments throughout the treaty. According to Amnesty International, the deal reportedly fails to address justice for the victims of serious crimes by not including any provisions aimed at holding their perpetrators accountable or even attempting restorative justice.
Various countries within sub-Saharan Africa have utilised restorative justice on multiple occasions in post-violent situations, most notably Rwanda. An end to this conflict should include attempts at providing justice to the various displaced, killed, and wounded victims of the war. It is not enough for it to be just an avenue for the various governments to profit from unearthing natural resources.
Furthermore, the deal itself has been met with skepticism by significant parties, including Amnesty International and President Paul Kagame of Rwanda. Kagame stated that he is unsure if the peace will hold. He further mentioned that he would respond in kind if the Congolese government failed to uphold its end of the bargain regarding the alleged support of the FDLR.
In response to this, it is important to highlight that the governments of the DRC and Rwanda have an obligation to end their support for the FDLR and the M23, respectively, regardless of what the agreement signed between both countries outlines. Stopping material support for groups that cause the deaths of civilians should not be dependent on signing an agreement, and should not be further dependent on an agreement signed by rebel groups like M23.
Finally, the inclusion of other countries within the East African Community and the African Union is a significant gap in the agreement. Rwanda and the DRC are not the only countries affected by this conflict; therefore, their inclusion in this agreement would signify a legitimate attempt to secure peace rather than secure rare earth materials.
Edited by Lubaba Mahmud
