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During the Cold War, the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union led both countries to invest heavily in nuclear power to discourage attacks with the threat of a weapon of mass destruction. The Soviet Union used Central Asia’s soil, rich in uranium, to serve its ambition to become a nuclear power.
For 40 years, Kazakhstan’s Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site, also called the Polygon, was secretly used as a laboratory for nuclear weapons testing. Today, this area in the northeast of the country is known as “the world’s worst radiation hotspot” since over 450 nuclear explosions occurred between 1949 and 1991. In western Kyrgyzstan, the Mailuu-Suu district was a huge uranium mine “where more than 9,000 tonnes of uranium were produced between 1946 and 1967.” Although Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan became independent with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the ghost of the Soviet nuclear past still haunts Central Asia. Nuclear waste represents hazardous health and environmental risks in Kyrgyzstan, while the Kazakh victims of the Polygon tests still struggle to rebuild their lives with insufficient reparations.
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Today, nuclear energy reappears in both states’ public debates as a potential alternative energy source to address the annual winter power crisis hitting the region. Kazakhstan held a referendum in October 2024 regarding the construction of a new nuclear power plant. Kyrgyzstan banned uranium mining in 2019, but the government lifted this prohibition in June 2024.
Yet, are the populations ready to look past the Soviet dark nuclear history? As past, present and future scars left by the Soviet legacy resurfaced, Kazakh victims still wait for reparations, and the Kyrgyz nuclear waste management seems to stagnate.
The Insufficient Reparations for the Semipalatinsk Victims in Kazakhstan
From 1949 to 1989, the Soviet Polygon launched 456 nuclear tests, including 116 above ground. It is equivalent to “a Hiroshima-intensity bomb every six months” for 40 years. Documentation shows that scientists secretly studied the effects of radiation exposure on the human body. Hence, the Soviet authorities reportedly asked residents to step outside their homes during explosions. In total, 1.5 million people would have been exposed to high levels of radioactivity during this period.
Local authorities still fail to acknowledge any relationship between this forced exposure and the health crisis in the area. Yet, the Polygon region has the highest cancer rate in all of Kazakhstan and a lower life expectancy than the national level. The tests affected several generations: today, one in 20 children is born with severe malformation or chronic illnesses, leading to an overcrowding of orphanages and pediatric hospitals.
As a result, the Kazakh government created a system of “radiated passports,” which allows the victims to receive free medical care and some money. Yet, the victims disapprove of the inadequate support; the allowance is not enough to live on or to pay for medication or medical equipment such as wheelchairs.
Access to hospitals treating radiated patients is also difficult in this rural region. The lengthy paperwork also often discourages the victims from getting the “radiated status” with such limited benefits in the first place.
The nuclear tests took place on over 18,000 square kilometers, almost amounting to the size of Lake Ontario, and severely damaged the surrounding environment. Today, the Polygon and its region attract “dark tourists,” fascinated by sites associated with death under strict surveillance. The Kazakh government and several international organizations have taken steps to secure the highest-radiated zones, clean up the area, and relocate the population. Yet, many people continue to live in very contaminated areas because of the lack of resources to move away.
The Environmental Threat of the Soviet Nuclear Waste in Kyrgyzstan
In Kyrgyzstan, the Soviets extracted uranium from 92 mines, including 23 in Mailuu-Suu, where they created their first atomic bomb. The mining activities officially stopped in 1992 with Kyrgyz independence, but “several million cubic meters of toxic and radioactive waste” remain in the ground. In 2010, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had already warned about the “urgent need for a cleanup” of the Mailuu-Suu’s dumps, hidden in the fragile surrounding hills.
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The radioactivity level in the town can be up to 64 microsieverts per hour, which is above the IAEA safety standards of 50 microsieverts per year for nuclear workers. This exposure results in a high number of cancers, typhoid fevers, and birth anomalies. Most residents cannot afford medical treatment and still wait for financial compensation from the government.
Evidence also indicates alarming toxicity in the river flowing to the highly-populated Ferghana Valley. This fertile area represents a vital – yet disputed – water supply for Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and is the “key agricultural center” of Central Asia. The weakening of the uranium dumps, poor security of the sites, and seismic activity put the region at risk of further radioactive contamination. Such incidents have already occurred several times, but studies have warned that the next one could severely damage unstable dumps and lead to a “Chernobyl-scale nuclear disaster.”
Relocating uranium waste to stable and safer places requires dozens of millions of euros. While the World Bank, among other international organizations, has funded the securitization of some of the Mailuu-Suu’s dumps, the project has met widespread distrust among the locals due to the lack of information on the operation and radioactivity. So far, the allocated funds have been insufficient to secure the entirety of the dangerous waste site.
Facing the Energy Crisis amidst Cold Winters
For several years, Central Asia has been affected by winter power cuts mainly due to the lack of investments in infrastructure and heavy reliance on Russian electricity, which is now under sanctions. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are now looking at nuclear energy to compensate for the deterioration of their infrastructure and re-boost their economy.
While Kazakhstan closed down all nuclear testing facilities after the 1991 fall of the Soviet Union, the government has recently reintroduced a nuclear plant construction project. It met popular opposition because of the deadly Soviet legacy, the high water consumption of nuclear energy amidst water scarcity, and the pending threat of waste contamination. In 2023, the Kazakh president proposed a referendum on constructing nuclear plants. He argued that nuclear energy would ensure a stable electricity source in the context of the chronic winter power outages and enable the country to become a global leader in uranium mining.
Kyrgyz nuclear history is more complex because of an active environmental civil society. Following anti-nuclear protests, the parliament voted for the prohibition of uranium mining in 2019 to address the population’s environmental and health worries over the Min-Kush site. However, in June 2024, the Kyrgyz parliament voted to lift the 2019 ban on uranium mining to enable the extraction of high-demand minerals and create new jobs.
The Russian state corporation Rosatom, which specializes in nuclear energy, also announced the future construction of a small nuclear plant in Kyrgyzstan. On this, the government declared “the final decision would be made by results of the countrywide discussion,” echoing the Kazakh process.
The Reluctant (Russian) Nuclear Future for Central Asia
On October 6, 2024, the results of the Kazakh referendum were 70% in favour of the construction project, with a turn-out rate of over 60%. The southern population, in particular, showed high support, hoping that the plant construction would create employment opportunities, while ‘no’ won in big cities because of environmental concerns. Many organizations denounced pressure and interference with the referendum process, including a dominating pro-nuclear narrative in the media and the shaming of opponents. Reports show that authorities arrested or intimidated with fines at least a dozen anti-nuclear activists before the referendum.
In Kyrgyzstan, only a few days after the lift on uranium mining, a Russian truck containing uranium waste crashed and fell into a river. While fears of regional water contamination re-emerged, the government reportedly attempted to cover up the accident with news delays and fake images. The government signed a decontamination plan in July 2024 with Rosatom that included safety measures for uranium transport to calm the population.
In both countries, the deadly legacy of Soviet nuclear activities has much of the population worried about potential involvement from the Russian Federation in current nuclear affairs, especially after hostile “operations at the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant in Ukraine.” The question of the plant contractor is still pending in Kazakhstan, with the Russian state-controlled company Rosatom as a frontrunner. Meanwhile, Kyrgyzstan signed an agreement with Rosatom for decontamination and waste transportation, as illustrated by the recent truck accident. These deals might increase the Russian “influence on [Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan]’s policy choices.”
The recent Kazakh referendum and the Kyrgyz concerns following the uranium waste accidents highlight a divide between governmental choices and public opinion. In this context, any missteps in safety or transparency could worsen the public opposition and spark more protests across both countries.
Protecting Present and Future Victims
The lack of information surrounding nuclear toxicity is significant in both countries and continues to affect local populations. The Semipalatinsk victims were lied to about the Polygon’s activities via Soviet propaganda for decades. Today, children still play on highly contaminated rubble near the Polygon, lacking nuclear safety education and health screenings. In Kyrgyzstan, the population living next to the most precarious uranium waste sites should receive transparent information on radiation risks to avoid accidental exposure. This educational work can ensure acknowledgement of victims’ burden and prevent future human disasters with long-term consequences.
Without investments, both governments should engage further with international organizations for technical assistance to control radiation levels with real-time monitoring systems, prevent access to locals or thieves, and secure the precarious Kyrgyz dumps. There might be room for cooperation between both states on waste management, nuclear safety, and international funding. Cooperation with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan could be beneficial, as a regional environmental crisis threatens the Ferghana Valley.
Today, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan face the challenges of their respective Soviet nuclear legacies as they try to resolve the seasonal energy crisis. While Kazakhstan struggles to tackle the long-lasting health and environmental consequences endured by the Polygon’s victims, Kyrgyzstan fails to secure what is left of the Soviet uranium industry. In both countries, governments try to carefully navigate between economic development through nuclear energy and skepticism in the population.
This anti-nuclear sentiment finds roots in the need for public safety after past disasters, the insufficient support for victims, and the fear of further Russian involvement in internal affairs. To move forward with nuclear energy, increased transparency, education, and international cooperation should be central to both governments’ efforts to address the populations’ concern that history is repeating itself.
Edited by Chelsea Bean

