(Photo by Barke11 via Wikimedia Commons/CC BY-SA 4.0)
On June 6, 2024, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso countries came together to proclaim their confederation into the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). This development followed the overthrow of democratically elected leaders in those countries in the last three years. The new Sahelien leaders cited issues of regional security, particularly regarding the spread of terrorism, as well as poor economic conditions as central reasons for overthrowing their governments.
The AES represents a turning point for regional instability in West Africa; despite condemnation from elected officials worldwide and international organizations like The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), domestic public opinion of these leaders has so far been generally positive. Leaders of the AES have broadly lobbied for military cooperation, nationalization of foreign-owned resources, and the spread of anti-Western sentiment.
With economic forecasts of growth alongside hundreds of deaths in ongoing insurgencies, overall reactions to the new governments’ policies remain mixed. After almost a year of confederation and several years post-coup, it is worth assessing how these new administrations in the Sahel have performed so far in solving the issues upon which they came to power.
Why Anti-Western Sentiment?
Following their independence in 1960, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso have continued to struggle politically and economically for a variety of reasons. One factor is that France, unlike other former colonizers, has maintained active involvement in its former colonies. In a policy known as françafrique, France has secretly supported coup d’etats in the region, overthrowing leaders in favour of those with pro-French sentiments. In Burkina Faso, popular leader Thomas Sankara was assassinated in 1987 under mysterious circumstances by individuals affiliated with his rival Blaise Compaoré, who cultivated a pro-France relationship for the next 22 years.
The European country has also stunted these nations’ growth through the ‘CFA franc.’ This system reflects the former colonial relationship; 12 West African countries’ currencies are directly tied to the franc (and later, the euro) as at least 50 percent of their currencies must be held in French reserves.
While other factors have undoubtedly kept the West African region from developing, France’s policies towards its former colonies have ultimately guaranteed its own influence at the expense of slowing their development. Though French President Emmanuel Macron has made efforts to denounce this harmful relationship, the lack of meaningful change ultimately led to a distrust in the status quo and, thus, a rise in anti-French sentiment.
Regaining Economic Sovereignty
The AES countries’ primary stated goal is to re-establish their sovereignty. For Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, this has meant regaining domestic control over their natural resources and borders while reducing foreign ownership and control of its politics. Burkina Faso’s president, Ibrahim Traoré, stated in a speech that “we do not ask that anyone intervene to affect our destiny. The Burkinabé people have decided to fight—to fight against terrorism in order to improve our development.”
So far, the greatest achievements of the AES have been in this realm. Both Mali and Burkina Faso have nationalized foreign-owned mining operations, bringing millions of dollars in revenues back into the country. Niger has accomplished the same with some of its many uranium extraction plants. All three countries are experiencing economic growth, with Niger being the fastest-growing economy in Africa and 3rd fastest-growing economy in the world.
Despite some gains, all three countries are still considered ‘low income’ and rank low in international measures of development. Even though international observers cite concerns that AES policies might prove harmful in the long term, socio-economic prospects currently appear generally positive. AES leaders have also put forth plans for establishing a new common currency, a common passport reduced for increased intra-AES mobility, and other measures to facilitate economic cooperation amongst the West African countries.
A New Tide Sweeping Françafrique?
In Niger and Burkina Faso, the coup leaders’ policies have earned them general popular support. In particular, the latter’s leader, Ibrahim Traoré, has gained significant popularity not just in the region but continentally and worldwide: Ghanaian youth who were polled about the coup leaders expressed praise for the Burkinabé leader.
Traoré and the AES’s anti-Western populism has already influenced other countries in the region — candidates Bassirou Diomaye Faye and Ousmane Sonko won Senegal’s 2024 election on a platform of similar decolonial causes. The President and Prime Minister, respectively, have pushed the region to adopt greater diplomatic cooperation with the AES and have echoed some of their rhetoric regarding reducing foreign influence over their affairs, particularly about the CFA franc.
What is clear from these developments is that a change from the status quo is wanted, needed, and possible. The commonality between Traoré and Senegal’s new leaders is a desire to move beyond the prior methods of government and beyond leaders who, despite being democratically elected, have been in power for decades and plagued with corruption.
Security & Uncertainty in the Sahel
Though there are undoubtedly positives that have resulted from these developments in the Sahel, many international observers have highlighted the problems with military rule in the AES. In Niger, for example, the coup government has postponed democratic elections, censored international journalism, and jailed dissidents.
Concerns regarding democracy are well-founded, but arguably, the greatest challenge to the AES’s long-term survival lies in its ability to resolve its security concerns. The region’s internal security crises began in 2012, when Tuareg separatist rebels began attacking Malian forces in the north of the country. Soon, ISIS & al-Qaeda affiliated groups began to form offshoots from these rebel groups and spread throughout the Sahel. The ensuing crisis, which involved a coup d’etat in the country, prompted a French-led international intervention in 2013.
While French forces helped retake major cities in the country, after 8 years they failed to contain the ISIS threat. This poor legacy prompted AES’s leaders to push French armed forces out of their countries. In 2023 alone, the fight between al-Qaeda affiliated groups, the Malian armed forces, and other armed groups in the nation’s north has killed over 12,000 civilians; to date, the conflict has displaced over 3 million people in the region. With violence still ongoing, public opinion of Mali’s leader Assimi Goïta has suffered from a lack of progress on solving this crisis.
Since coming to power, AES leaders have pivoted from enlisting the help of Western armed forces to employing mercenaries from the Russian Wagner Group. Already accused of killing civilians on other fronts like Ukraine, Wagner Group forces murdered hundreds of civilians during their enlistment to the north of Mali from 2022 to 2023. Though the group has since dissolved following the death of its leader, Russia has now formally created an ‘Africa Corps’ regiment to take their place.
The Tuareg Question & Crisis of Confidence
Another dimension that complicates the resolution of conflict in the Sahel is the self-determination of the Tuareg people. A historically nomadic Amazigh ethnic group, with the creation of national borders following independence, the Tuareg have consistently struggled for representation within the region. In 2012, Tuareg separatists formed the Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), proclaiming an independent country of Azawad in Mali’s north.
Though Azawad was short-lived and internationally unrecognized, the MNLA still controls significant territory in Mali and remains caught between Malian armed forces, al-Qaeda, and ISIS-affiliated groups. Despite legitimate aims of representation, the new administrations of Mali and AES countries have repeated the rhetoric of old administrations; they frequently label Tuareg separatists as ‘terrorists’ and conflate them with al-Qaeda and ISIS-affiliated groups.
Not all in the northern Sahel support the establishment of Azawad. In particular, the Fula and Songhay are significant minority groups with large populations throughout the north of the region and have generally supported coexistence within Mali. Even still, a crucial aspect of solving this conflict lies in how AES administrations confront the historical wrongdoing toward the Tuareg.
Sahel States’ Struggle for Sovereignty
The Alliance of Sahel States has enjoyed relative support for its promising economic reforms and anti-colonial outlook despite the fact that its existence came about after a series of military coup d’etats. The Sahelien Confederation will continue to face challenges because of this fact, and international actors and observers will remain skeptical, whether for valid human rights concerns or fear of their bold reforms.
Regardless, in order to maintain long-term success, AES leaders must differentiate between law and order solutions and the promotion of reconciliation for minority groups in their addressing of the threat of al-Qaeda and ISIS-affiliated groups. Only time will reveal whether the Alliance of Sahel States can resolve the conflict, return resources to local Saheliens, and achieve true sovereignty.
Edited by Anthony Hablak
