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Since their independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have never agreed on their 975-kilometer border. This border dispute has led to regular clashes. For example, from 2011 to 2013, “63 violent incidents happened on the Kyrgyz-Tajik border.”
Looking at the map, the geography of the Central Asian countries’ borders seems twisted. These lines take root in the Soviet period. Before then, both Kyrgyz and Tajiks were living on livestock production and agriculture. Kyrgyz were nomads while Tajiks tended to live in one place for a long period. The Soviet period reorganized the way of life of both populations on a fixed and collective pasture model. The Soviet leader Stalin established the first administrative borders of the present-day national territories. However, these borders held little significance because, then, all nations were unified under the Soviet flag.
The fall of the Soviet Union was a massive disturbance for these nation-states as they tried to agree on their borders. The dispute lies primarily in the Batken region and especially the Ferghana Valley because of its fertile land and access to water. In 2021 and 2022, the clashes took a turn with violent armed confrontations at the border. Both governments signed a peace agreement, which reopened the discussion to settle the border dispute. While the process has been slow, 2024 could see the end of this 30-year-old dispute.
Water Security as a Key Cause
Both Tajik and Kyrgyz economies rely heavily on agriculture, especially livestock production. The attractivity of this sector has led to rapid population growth in the Ferghana Valley on both sides of the border. The population growth creates tensions between herders and puts pressure on pasture resources, who often blame each other for the “incorrect distribution of water,” adding to the impact of climate change. Yearly disputes arise during the driest seasons because of the lack of water for irrigation and cattle. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan use several underfunded water facilities from the Soviet period.
In 2014, the dispute grew as armed forces intervened with heavy weaponry for the first time in these water clashes. In 2021, another armed conflict over the common Golovny water reserve broke out. Over 40 people died, many houses and infrastructure were destroyed, and tens of thousands of people fled the violence. A ceasefire was signed, which lasted until January 2022, when armed clashes resumed. The confrontation comes to a head in a four-day conflict in September, killing over 50 civilians and displacing over 136,000 people. This conflict was the deadliest episode in the three-decade disagreement. On September 20, 2022, both governments signed a final peace agreement to settle the border issue.
Securitization of the Dispute
The border dispute is difficult to solve because both sides use it for political purposes. In the 2021 Kyrgyz presidential elections, candidate Sadyr Japarov made “territorial sovereignty and border security” a strong campaign argument. Shortly after being elected, Japarov tried to settle the dispute to increase his popularity by conducting military exercises at the border. These exercises only raised tensions a few weeks before the 2021 conflict.
In Tajikistan, the authoritarian President Emomali Rahmon has witnessed the conflict unfold since he was first elected in 1992. Many think that Rahmon is preparing a handover to his son, Rustam Emomali. Still, using Kyrgyz people as the cause for the Tajiks’ unhappiness helps redirect the attention from other national problems. At the same time, a “short victorious war [would showcase] regime stability” behind a strong leader. In this context, any land compromise would undermine the president’s image.
While both governments have used “nationalist resentment” to boost their legitimacy, there is an asymmetry in their communication strategies. In Tajikistan, long-standing censorship and low digital literacy make public resistance difficult. Voices criticizing the conflict approve of the president’s leadership by blaming Kyrgyzstan. Besides, the lack of verified information from the government forces independent journalists to rely on the Kyrgyz press.
In Kyrgyzstan, the government has more difficulties managing the border narratives because of its active civil society. On social media, the Kyrgyz population criticizes Tajikistan “for aggression against Kyrgyzstan” and their government for their response. Hence, the Kyrgyz government faces a dilemma: either stepping down and appearing unable to defend national economic interests or fueling the escalation and causing more casualties and destruction.
2023 and 2024 Border Settlement Process
The 2022 peace agreement sparked momentum to stop the violence related to the border dispute and settle it. As 2023 was passing without any major incident, Kamchybek Tashiev, the chairman of the Kyrgyz Commission on the Demarcation and Delimitation of the Kyrgyz-Tajik border, made a worrying declaration on the first anniversary of the 2022 conflict. He announced the discovery of documents stating that “parts of Tajikistan used to be Kyrgyz territory” and threatened to investigate further if Tajikistan did not withdraw from these parts.
This declaration could have triggered another conflict at the border amidst the fragile process of border settlement, as the Russian Foreign Minister underlined. Yet, President Japarov did not comment on his second in command’s statement, showing a willingness to break the repeating conflict cycle.
Apart from this incident, the negotiation process seems to be going well. The 2022 peace agreement seemed to have sparked a momentum to stop the violence related to the border dispute and finally settle it. In September 2022, the two governments recognized only 504 kilometres of the common border. In April 2024, the settlement process enabled “the sides [to agree] on about 800 [kilometres] of the common border.”
Local and Regional Consequences of the Status Quo
Following the 2021 conflict, Kyrgyzstan decided to close their side of the border and announced it would reopen only after the end of the settlement process. The slow negotiations have several consequences for the region and the population.
Commercial relationships between the two countries have significantly decreased since workers cannot cross the border freely or do certain jobs because of ethnicity. Besides, this unclear border enables a lawless zone with increasing trafficking. People struggle to keep a “normal life” when their relatives live across the closed border. Some civilian infrastructures are still to be rebuilt, leaving out-of-school children. Local ethnic groups are at risk of losing their heritage due to the lack of diplomatic relations between the two countries.
The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a Russian-led regional organization for security in Central Asia, has also been criticized for its weak response. Russia’s focus on invading Ukraine let the status quo in Central Asia settle in. The CSTO was late to propose a negotiation in the dispute, leading Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to purchase an increasing number of high-tech weapon systems sent to the border. The Kyrgyz government declared that the national defence spending “[has] risen exponentially over the past three years.” Yet, the administration argues that a CSTO peacekeeping force preventing the escalation would have avoided this arms race.
Re-Shifting the Focus on the People
Although the border settlement negotiation seems to have advanced quicker since 2022 than in the past three decades, the process remains slow. While awaiting a resolution, people living at the border cannot enjoy the full realization of their rights while both governments stock up on weaponry. This arms race weakens the conflict resolution process.
Water security is an essential element of this conflict, worsened by climate change and underfunding of infrastructure. If this border dispute only started as numerous stone-throwing clashes between herders, political elites took hold of the issue to serve their interests. Still, water scarcity must be addressed adequately by considering water-saving agricultural practices and lessening tensions over resources.
After the 2022 peace agreement, media attention shifted their focus to other current events, such as the Russian neighbour’s war against Ukraine. The Tajik government did not recognize any victims of the 2021 conflict and refused to answer Human Rights Watch’s call for documentation. This denial leaves thousands of Kyrgyz and Tajiks, who fled the violence, unheard.
It is important to remember that this conflict, used for other purposes by political elites, has at its heart the survival of communities — working in a land weakened by climate change. Thus, bringing local communities to the table instead of closed-door talks is necessary to resolve this long land dispute. Their participation is key to rebuilding inter-community trust and faith in governments.
Edited by Gabrielle Andrychuk
