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With Russia being one of the biggest suppliers of salmon in the world, there is an increasing threat to the international supply when dealing with Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) salmon fishing globally. Despite adopting policies that focus on combating illegal fishing, the country’s environmental governance fails. The inertia of the power dynamics in Russia, along with an exploitative supply chain of commercial fishing, makes the country’s governance of IUU salmon fishing inefficient.
Current Policies Addressing IUU Practices
When trying to protect IUU practices, several policies have been pushed by Russia that are worth mentioning.
Russia combats IUU fishing through laws like No. 166-FZ, which confiscates illegally caught fish, and Article 256 of the Criminal Code, penalizing illegal harvesting in protected areas with prison or labour. Russia also has the Fisheries Law, where Article 54 allows the seizure of illegal resources, including fishing and gear. The main resource for fishery regulation, though, is the Federal Law on Fisheries, which sets catch limits and fishing rules.
The law also puts management measures in place to control the fishing conditions, such as specifying the closure of fishing and gear regulations. In addition, the catch of anadromous species, such as salmon, fish that migrate up into freshwater to spawn, must be recommended and approved by the Commission for Anadromous Fish Species.
Moreover, Russia has also been a part of international cooperation agreements to manage shared stock with other countries. Russia participates in international agreements like the Russian-Norwegian Fisheries Commission (JRNFC) to manage shared fish stocks. For instance, salmon in the Barents Sea are caught under quotas based on scientific research, with harvesting limited to Russian economic zones and permits.
Challenges in the Fight against Salmon Poaching and IUU Practices
Despite policies against illegal fishing, economic incentives continue to harm salmon populations. For instance, the regional sockeye in the Kamchatka River basin was listed as an endangered species in 2008 by the IUCN Red List. Its primary reason? Illegal fishing pressure. However, if Russia values its salmon, why does IUU fishing persist? What drives indifference to these practices?
The issue revolves around a deep economic depression in Russia’s population, leading to a lack of jobs and the marginalization of local fishing families who rely on such resources for survival. With the collapse of subsidized rural economies in Russia’s Far East, many fishing towns that relied on salmon for income were affected. Especially the generations that grew up in the middle of the illegal salmon fisheries have been used to getting the highest local wages generated by the high demand for salmon caviar all over the country.
As a result of the economic regression, people in these fishing villages started to claim that their hard work for the state was not paid back appropriately, which led them to feel entitled to fish freely without licenses. It is also believed that state representatives harvest salmon through not fully legitimate means, giving rise to a mentality of “If the state cheats us, we cheat them” among the people. Apart from that, most people in these fishing villages do not have the means to buy permits regularly, making IUU seem like their only choice.
The illegal market for salmon is a lucrative part of an overall illegal seafood trade business estimated to be worth 3.0 billion dollars for the region of Kamchatka alone back in the early 2009s. Demand for roe is constantly increasing, with the sale of “red gold” (salmon roe) being a very profitable resource for Russia. Even the Russian port’s capacity is inadequate to handle the quantity of salmon being legally harvested due to quality control demands and inadequate transportation networks for the shipment of salmon.
Systemic Challenges In Addressing the IUU Issue
The Russian government’s focus on power and weak enforcement of policies also undermine efforts to protect its salmon. Illegal fishing, driven by its commercial value, depletes salmon stocks and prohibits the growth of sustainable fishing and economic development. In a word, it is in Russia’s economic interest to maintain IUU practices: in many areas in the Far East Region of Russia, poaching has become commercialized, forming an “economy inside an economy” governed by its own rules.
Further, loopholes in legislation and widespread corruption compromise efforts to combat IUU fishing in Russia. The lack of clear criminal definitions of IUU makes it difficult to prosecute criminal networks. For more specific examples, although positive, the previously mentioned Law No.166-FZ is unclear on whether the violator would be criminally or civilly prosecuted, with no mention of prison time in the law.
Furthermore, corruption marks the country in a widespread manner, where IUU activities of a transnational nature can take place with the active collaboration of Russian officials. All these factors combined, the more serious offences are less frequently prosecuted, and in most cases, small players in IUU practices are the ones who usually end up punished; in fact, less than 0.01% of illegally fished salmon, and no more than 2% of illegal caviar were confiscated across the Russian Far East in 2006.
Corruption and Political Dynamics Impacting IUU Fishing Governance
As mentioned, corruption in the nation is a critical factor that prevents Russia from successfully combating IUU. Until 2002, driftnet fishing vessels often used fake port clearance documents to bypass Japanese regulations on foreign fish. Japanese buyers rarely checked the authenticity of these documents, fueling dishonesty in the business. Although new laws require fish caught in Russian waters to be processed at Russian ports, inadequate infrastructure makes enforcement difficult.
The authoritative government of Vladimir Putin has also been preventing the flourishing of better policies to combat IUU activities, with a lack of transparency and throwback measures occurring. Fisheries resources under this government are considered strategic resources, making Putin not feel prone to sharing information with “outsiders,” specifically the West. The war in Ukraine negatively impacted the fishing industry, with one of the largest brain drains since the dissolution of the USSR, and direct impacts on the private sector due to sanctions and loosening of business ties with partners like Japan.
Russian NGOs were also threatened by the government’s designation of WWF Russia as an “undesirable organization.” The Wild Salmon Center (WSC), an organization that aims to protect wild salmon strongholds, was accused by Russia in 2023 of working to hinder the country’s economy. Their initiatives to create protected natural areas in the Russian Far East were charged with aiming to exclude territories and restrict fishing by Russian companies in favour of foreign NGOs and individuals. This political crackdown led the organization to cease all operations in the country and made the interaction of Russians with WSC illegal. Before WWF was excluded from Russia, there were already concerns about its effectiveness.
Russia ignored WWF’s recommendation to ban fishing in the Amur River for at least four years to allow chum salmon to recover, leading to a sharp decline in the population. Such calls were disregarded by the government and fishing companies, claiming that it would hamper businesses and the fishing community that relied on the harvest of salmon. Further, Russian courts rejected Indigenous communities’ efforts to establish “territories of traditional natural resources,” labelling their traditional fishing as poaching despite its cultural and subsistence importance.
Sustainable Practices and Accountability Are Crucial
It becomes clear after diving into Russia’s acts on governance towards IUU practices that the future of global environmental governance will be greatly compromised if better policies are not considered. With radical catches and predominantly dormant and non-compliant attitudes of Russia, the salmon species in the area will not be able to be sustained if better laws of accountability and controlling/managing illegal fishing are not prioritized.
There are several courses of action that Russia can take to improve its environmental governance on IUU, such as creating waste-free technologies, transparently boosting the competitiveness of domestic salmon, creating new cost-effective jobs, and reducing unemployment rates to help marginalized fishing communities. The country should also start involving stakeholders to combat corruption, improve transparency in its policy-making, and stop prioritizing commercial fishing at the cost of environmentally sustainable fishing. By protecting salmon, we safeguard watersheds as a whole, including human communities that depend on such resources.
Edited by Alexandra Hu
