(Photo by Kristina Alexanderson via eunews/CC BY-SA 4.0 DEED)
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The threat posed by Russian disinformation continues to be a major concern for the EU and its members. Although not new, the threat has intensified in recent years as the internet and online realm expand. The Kremlin has adapted well to the digital environment, adjusting its strategies to effectively influence online platforms and websites within the EU. The strategies contributed to decreased political cohesion among European countries and even fostered divisions regarding the war in Ukraine.
Today, Russia uses disinformation as a key tool to advance its imperialist foreign policy. Russian actors frequently propagate narratives that aim to justify Putin’s war against Ukraine, even as this conflict significantly damages Russia’s reputation on the world stage.
By promoting false narratives, Russian tactics seek to weaken European states by dividing societies and potentially fostering an environment more prone to harbour anti-Ukrainian sentiment. A more divided Europe may be less unified in support of Ukraine, which could affect overall economic and military aid to Ukraine in Russia’s favour. If EU funding for Ukraine drops drastically, then Ukraine will have less with which to fight on the battlefield, providing Russia with a much-needed advantage in the war.
European member states recognize the dangers of Russian disinformation, especially regarding national security and election interference. A united front against Russian disinformation remains challenging, and member states must strengthen their efforts against these attacks individually.
Russia’s continued aggression in the online space remains a serious concern, especially for Central European countries such as Slovakia and the Czech Republic. In relatively recent years, Slovakia and the Czech Republic have shown to be much more susceptible to Russian disinformation.
A History of Manipulation
Russian disinformation is not a new phenomenon, tracing back to the Cold War era. During then, the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (KBG), the Soviet Union’s secret state police, actively relied on disinformation as a weapon against both domestic and foreign opponents such as the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Meanwhile, Modern-day Russia broadly utilizes disinformation efforts to promote state-sponsored narratives abroad and divide Western audiences.
Popular narratives pushed by the Russian government include the notion that Russia is fighting a war of self-defense in Ukraine and that the West will collapse as a result of its lack of “traditional values” and morals. By attacking Western values and claiming to be on the right side of the war in Ukraine, Russia seeks to portray itself as a righteous superpower pushing back against Western incursion.
Russia uses several strategies to wage its information war. First and foremost, the Kremlin and other ministries push Russian disinformation at the highest official level. More effectively, however, disinformation is spread by Russian state-sponsored media outlets such as RT and Sputnik. Other sources of Russian disinformation come from “troll farms” and bot accounts, which flood online spaces with as much disinformation as possible to distort the truth.
The Kremlin also depends on other individuals, websites, and publications to push Russian disinformation in Europe. These may include various websites promoting Russian propaganda or pro-Russian organizations such as Rossotrudnichestvo, which have been behind pro-Russian protests in Europe. Rossotrudnichestvo, a Russian federal government agency which maintains offices throughout Europe, is believed to have been directly involved in orchestrating pro-Russian protests in Berlin by reaching out to Russian expats.
However, a growing number of pro-Russian politicians who openly advocate for friendlier ties with Putin aid Russian efforts in Europe despite major EU opposition.
Slovakia—A Hotspot for Russian Narratives?
In April 2024, Peter Pellegrini won Slovakia’s presidency, joining Prime Minister Robert Fico and helping to cement pro-Russian views at the government level. Fico’s coalition, which includes Pelligrini’s party, has previously halted arms shipments to Ukraine and has even questioned the legitimacy of providing aid to Ukraine. Additionally, several other parties in Slovakia, such as the Slovak National Party (SNS), hold pro-Russian policy stances, which include shifting blame for the war in Ukraine away from Russia and condemning the sanctions placed against them.
On May 15, Fico was shot five times in an assassination attempt, which caught the country and even the rest of Europe by surprise. Even before Slovak authorities were able to identify the shooter and their potential motives, pro-Russian media channels and influencers were quick to blame Ukraine for the act, insinuating that Fico fell victim because of his pro-Russian views. Although stated that the shooter acted alone, this is just one example of Russia’s attempt at taking advantage of Europe’s political divide.
Russian disinformation is most active in social media, with more than 350,000 election-related disinformation posts recorded last year in Slovakia, many of which shared pro-Russian narratives. Unfortunately, the Russian disinformation targeted at Slovakia seems to be making headway, as today, only 40 percent of Slovaks believe Russia is to blame for the war, with another 30 percent blaming the West for “provoking” Russia. In contrast, half of Slovaks believed Russia was to blame for the war in 2022. This rise in pro-Russian sentiment could be attributed, at least in part, to the growing extent of Russian disinformation in the country.
Many Slovaks also question the country’s foreign policy, with only half in support of NATO. When asked why Russian disinformation is so effective in the country, former Slovak President Zuzana Čaputová stated that it could be due to a mix of “positive attitude to common Slavic roots and a certain view of history.” Many Slovaks have bought into the view of Russia as a Slavic “guardian” nation which stands up to the West and protects traditional values. As Russian disinformation campaigns continue to run rampant in the country, it is unlikely that there will be a large shift in attitudes any time soon.
The Czech Republic’s Fight Against Russian Disinformation
Slovakia is not the only EU country in Central Europe facing the threat of Russian disinformation. Its neighbour, the Czech Republic, also contends with major Russian political interference. In April 2024, the Czech government sanctioned the Prague-based news site Voice of Europe, which is linked to a pro-Russian influence operation. Viktor Medvedchuka, a pro-Russian Ukrainian oligarch behind the operation, was found to be interfering with EU elections by bribing EU politicians to promote pro-Russian sentiments and stir internal discord. In particular, Medveduchuka paid politicians to openly oppose sanctions against Russia and to argue against providing aid to Ukraine.
This scandal shocked the EU, highlighting the expanding reach of Moscow’s operations in Europe. In a comment for Der Spiegel, German Interior Minister Nancy Faeser remarked, “We again see the massive extent of lies and disinformation with which (Vladimir) Putin’s regime wants to shake trust in our democracy, stir up anger, and manipulate public opinion.” Although authorities exposed the Russian operation before the EU elections, the possibility of such interference in Europe has garnered significant attention.
Disinformation in the Czech Republic is quite complex but often starts on free-access websites and amplified through social media channels, such as Instagram, X, or Telegram. The Czech government has taken steps to combat this disinformation issue by banning websites known for spreading pro-Russian narratives.
The fight against disinformation remains an uphill battle. Strong opposition to new government policies aimed at curbing disinformation has persisted, and recently, this has led to the termination of the position of media and disinformation commissioner. Some voices within the Slovak government claim that policies designed to limit disinformation only increase censorship and infringe on free speech.
Concerns over potential restrictions on freedom of speech are not unwarranted. Given the communist history of the former Czechoslovakia, marked by censorship and surveillance, it is only natural for these questions to arise. However, people frequently test these limits.
For instance, Martina Bednarova, a Czech school teacher, reportedly told students that there was no war in Ukraine and that neo-Nazi Ukrainian forces were committing atrocities against Russian-speakers in Eastern Ukraine. While such rhetoric is clearly inappropriate for young learners, the question remains: should it be permitted online accessible to everyone, including children?
Unless authorities take direct action to limit the spread of Russian disinformation, including banning certain content, monitoring disinformation trends, and funding organizations that debunk Russian narratives, similar instances will likely recur. Russian state-sponsored narratives that distort or disregard the truth should have no place online or in public schools. Freedom of speech should not equate to the freedom to spread false information.
Less Talking, More Doing
Recognizing the growing threat of Russian disinformation is crucial, especially for EU countries near the Russian and Ukrainian borders, but acknowledgment alone is not enough. If EU politicians continue to overlook the issue or resist policies designed to combat Russian disinformation, the influence of Russian narratives will persist.
Banning media and websites directly linked to the Kremlin is a necessary initial measure. Authorities should also monitor websites and outlets responsible for promoting pro-Russian narratives. EU members should invest in initiatives, organizations, and individuals dedicated to countering Russian disinformation online. Expanding and funding EU projects, such as EUvsDisinfo, which work to identify and expose Russian disinformation across Europe, is essential.
EU governments should likewise take the necessary steps to promote better media literacy. Finland, for example, maintains a school curriculum dedicated to helping children identify disinformation and propaganda online. Increased media literacy throughout EU societies will help EU citizens to better spot disinformation online and help reduce its overall effect.
Additionally, addressing certain societal issues, such as the recent drop in public attitude towards Ukrainian refugees, could help to limit the role of Russian narratives. If attitudes towards Ukrainian refugees grow increasingly negative, then pro-Russian narratives may become more appealing to local citizens. Government initiatives and campaigns to integrate Ukrainian refugees into society may bring the locals and Ukrainians closer together.
Equipping European society with the necessary tools to identify Russian disinformation is crucial for limiting its spread. However, without direct action to tackle the issue, many will continue to fall victim to disinformation, undermining the EU’s democracy, political unity, and foreign policy.
Edited by Chelsea Bean
