(Photo by Thomas Guignard via Wikimedia Commons/CC BY-SA 2.0 DEED)
The conflict between Serbia and Kosovo has shaped the history of the Balkans for centuries. Following the breakup of Yugoslavia, tensions re-escalated, leading to the Kosovo War from 1998 to 1999. In 2008, Kosovo declared independence, separating almost 2 million people, 92% ethnic Albanians and 6% Serbs, from Serbia. Although several nations like the United States acknowledge Kosovo’s independence, five countries of the European Union (EU) still do not recognize Kosovo as a sovereign state.
War, Memory, and Unhealed Wounds
The clash between Serbs and Kosovars comes from long-standing ethnic and historical tensions. Many Serbs see Kosovo as the heart of Serbian history and identity. This strong connection dates back to the Battle of Kosovo in 1389, a major fight between the Serbian army, led by Prince Lazar, and the Ottoman Empire.
Although the Serbian forces fought bravely, the Ottomans ultimately won the battle. Over time, Serbia became part of the Ottoman Empire. Even though it was a military defeat, the battle became a powerful symbol in Serbian culture. Prince Lazar, whom the Ottomans captured and killed, is portrayed as a hero and saint by the Serbian Orthodox Church. Over time, this event became a national legend. Because of this, many Serbs believe that Kosovo is an essential part of their culture.
By the late Ottoman period in the 17th century, the population of Kosovo had become mostly Albanian and Muslim. A turning point came during the war between the Ottomans and Habsburgs (1683–1699), when Serbian populations moved north, and Ottoman control started to weaken. Serbia gained independence in 1878 and took control of Kosovo in 1912. That same year, Albanians also founded their first independent state. After World War I, both became part of Yugoslavia, uniting South Slavic nations.
Yugoslavia, founded in 1919 after the break-up of Austria-Hungary and the end of Ottoman rule in the Balkans, existed in different forms. The first was the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, created in 1929 from the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes after World War I. The second Yugoslavia, a socialist federation led by Josip Broz Tito from 1945 to 1980, consisted of six republics and two autonomous provinces, Vojvodina and Kosovo, where regions slowly gained more autonomy with their own governments, assemblies and communist party branches.
The Road To War and Humanitarian Intervention
In the late 20th century, tensions grew again due to re-centralization efforts. Under Slobodan Milošević’s regime, Serbian nationalism intensified, despite the population ratio of Serbs being less than 30%. In 1990, Milošević introduced laws to remove Kosovo’s autonomy, aiming to give Serbia extensive power and supremacy over other member states in the union.
Ultimately, this led to protests and the formation of Albanian-controlled institutions. In 1998, violence escalated after Serbian forces started fires and murdered 85 people attempting to push back the independence of Kosovo. The situation escalated, turning into war. Serbian forces killed around 10,000 Kosovars, 500 of them murdered in mass executions—an act often regarded as genocide. Many others were the victims of forcible displacement, rape, and were used as human shields in military attacks by Serb forces.
In March 1999, after witnessing the worsening of human rights abuses and the failure of peaceful conflict resolution through negotiation, NATO decided to launch an air bombing campaign of Yugoslavia for humanitarian intervention. Their reason was to put an end to the ethnic cleansing and forced expulsions of Kosovar Albanians. They intended to target military forces and to limit civilian harm. However, this attempt was not successful.
According to Human Rights Watch, around 500 Yugoslavs died during the 78 days as a result of illegitimate attacks on non-military civilian infrastructure targets such as the Serb Radio and Television. The intervention was done without approval from the United Nations, which is a violation of international law.
Although the bombing campaign stopped the immediate violence against the Kosovar population, it came at a high cost. Serbian forces had committed serious war crimes that needed to stop, but the use of illegal military force raises big questions about whether international organizations can justify the killing of civilians. Full peace never came. Kosovo declared independence in 2008, but Serbia still does not accept it.
Where Do Things Stand Now?
Despite Kosovo’s efforts to gain full autonomy, including the power to govern itself, make its own laws, control its borders, and decide how it operates independently, Serbia continues to try to extend its control. Tensions between the two states still remain because of continuing actions by Serbia, making it impossible to facilitate a dialogue.
In October 2024, Serbia passed draft laws designating Kosovo as a “special protection area” and extending the authority of Serbian courts into Kosovo territory, which Kosovo considers a violation of international law. Serbia has also continued sending trains carrying nationalist and Russian symbols into northern Kosovo. In November 2024, Albin Kurti, the Prime Minister of Kosovo, accused Belgrade of being involved in an explosion that damaged a key water canal serving the country’s main power plants.
Serbia maintains parallel institutions in northern Kosovo, including Serbian-run schools, courts, and services that bypass Kosovo’s legal authority. Concerningly, Kosovo accuses Belgrade of supporting paramilitary groups like the “North Brigade,” which is a terrorist organization according to Kosovar and international authorities, as they engaged in clearly organized brutal violence against civilians. Although Serbia denies these allegations, what is certain is that these actions fuel tension between the two countries.
What Divides the European Union?
In 2008, the International Criminal Court concluded that the adoption of the declaration of independence had not violated any applicable rule of international law. Following that, in 2022, Kosovo received a potential candidate status to become a member of the European Union. Despite the lawful separation of Kosovo and discussions of possible EU membership, Slovakia, Greece, Cyprus, Spain, and Romania still do not recognize Kosovo’s independence from Serbia. Why not? Simply put, ethnic minorities within a country’s territory.
Spain refuses to recognize Kosovo because of its own domestic separatist movements in Catalonia and Basque Country. Acknowledging Kosovo’s independence could strengthen separatist claims within its own borders. Spain also argues that Kosovo’s declaration violates international law by undermining the principle of territorial integrity.
Greece tries to balance relations with Serbia and maintain stability in the Balkans. Although Greece has not formally recognized Kosovo, it engages with it diplomatically and economically, even allowing a Kosovo office in Athens.
Cyprus does not recognize Kosovo because of the parallels it sees with Northern Cyprus, a self-declared state recognized only by Turkey. Supporting Kosovo’s independence would weaken Cyprus’s position in opposing Northern Cyprus’s legitimacy.
In Romania, around 1,5 million ethnic Hungarian minorities reside in Transylvania, who have occasionally raised autonomy demands. Acknowledging Kosovo resonates with encouraging separatism.
Slovakia has similar concerns with Romania regarding Hungarian ethnic groups. They number almost 400,000 and are the largest minority group in the country. Slovakia is cautious to encourage separatist aspirations within its own borders because of concerns about its ethnic minorities and separatist regions.
The Test of European Democracy
Kosovo’s partial recognition is still one of the most serious issues to the European Union’s enlargement plan. Although both sides supported the 2023 agreement to normalize relations between Kosovo and Serbia, it has yet to be signed or implemented. For both states, integration into the European Union presents an opportunity to resolve their long-standing conflict through peaceful dialogue, established legal frameworks, and shared political and economic objectives. In contrast to the violent military intervention by NATO in 1999, which failed to provide a lasting resolution, EU membership could create the conditions for stability and reconciliation.
Consequently, this internal EU divide on Kosovo’s independence undermines the region’s credibility as a unifying force and weakens its ability to facilitate enlargement. While Kosovo has made significant progress toward fulfilling the conditions to become an EU member, it remains excluded from candidacy status mainly because of the lack of recognition.
This contradiction sets a worrisome example for new candidates, especially for Ukraine: joining the European Union is essential in navigating the full-scale invasion by Russia, which violates the sovereignty of a European state. Still, there is a lack of agreement by the EU on how (and whether) to support Ukraine. Does the EU reward democratic reforms, or are political calculations more important?
The uneven treatment of ethnic minorities shows that the EU struggles to manage diversity. Until they find a way to address the Kosovo-Serbia question with unity, enlargement is still in danger. Other countries exert their power over the Western Balkans, which continues to face uncertainty. The longer the enlargement discussions take, the more space opens for other states, such as Russia, to extend their influence in the region. In order to be a credible global actor and respect its own values, the EU must not allow internal divisions over ethnic identity and national borders within its own territory.
Edited by Isaac Code
