(Photo by MINUSMA via Flickr/CC BY-NC-SA 2.0 DEED)
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The armed conflict between separatists and state actors in the northern deserts of Mali, which began to decline following a 2015 peace treaty, has significantly re-escalated in recent months. Clashes have renewed after Mali’s administration, which has been led by a military junta since 2021, ordered the departure of a UN peacekeeping mission in the north in June of 2023.
Since then, tensions have risen between the state and a coalition of armed groups of Tuareg people, an Amazigh ethnic group that predominantly resides in the Sahara. For some Tuareg groups, the erasure of their language, land, and overall way of life has fueled deep-seated animosity toward the Malian state, prompting many to take up arms.
Months of skirmishes between the two parties culminated in Mali’s retaking of the northern city of Kidal on November 14th. The reclaiming of the city, which has been under Tuareg control since a previous uprising in 2013, marks a major shift in what had remained a low-intensity conflict. As of October 2023, over 400 have been killed, with the deaths of over 80 Malian soldiers claimed by Tuareg rebels in October and numerous cities in the north of the country being captured by these groups.
To fully understand the ongoing Tuareg rebellion in Mali, we must consider the broader regional context, which includes the series of military coups in West Africa since 2020, the continuation of ISIS-affiliated insurgency, and the 2022 withdrawal of French security forces that had until then attempted to aid against ISIS-backed violence. These numerous factors and parties involved make it difficult to understand where the Tuareg stand in Mali’s domestic instability. Understanding the Tuareg perspective, rooted in legitimate grievances often sidelined by simplistic interpretations of the conflict as ‘extremist violence’, is integral to decode the region’s complex geopolitics.
Who Are the Tuareg?
The Tuareg are a nomadic Amazigh ethnic group whose population of approximately 3 million people is primarily located in Niger and Mali, with significant populations also located throughout Algeria, Burkina Faso, and Libya. Prior to colonial rule in North and West Africa, the Tuareg people practiced pastoralism throughout the Sahara in territories that now make up those five countries. They primarily existed on the outskirts of various empires, often working as nomadic merchants, herders, and small landholders.
With the creation of national borders during French colonial and post-independence eras, the nomadic Tuareg people, who once enjoyed relative freedom of movement, became significantly restricted. Though not their only grievance, this central restriction of mobility continues to infringe on their way of life and fuel talks of separatism from the countries they now fall under. In an interview with Nationalia, Tuareg poet Mahmoudan Hawad describes his own experience of alienation:
“When I turned 17, I could no longer live where I was born. It was the first time that colonial domination became impossible for my people to fight against. The Amazigh could not resist as they had before: with technology and with territorial encirclement, any clandestine resistance was impossible.”
Many Tuareg artists hailing from throughout West Africa have become internationally renowned for telling stories of this unique experience of “a people exiled in their own territory.” Besides restrictions on their movement throughout the region via national border control and visa regimes, the Tuareg also face the challenge of lacking political participation due to their minority status. As a result, their languages and culture are at risk of erasure.
In Mali, the Tuareg have initiated several rebellions against the state seeking greater autonomy and government representation. The First Tuareg Rebellion in the mid-1960s followed Mali’s independence from France, with periodic uprisings occurring until 2013. In 2013, Tuareg revolutionaries proclaimed the independence for a new state called Azawad in northern Mali, which was swiftly shot down by international organizations and local governments. Clashes resumed until 2015 when the Malian state negotiated a ceasefire with the rebels, promising to incorporate the rebels within the government and military and ultimately grant them greater autonomy.
So far, these measures, according to Tuareg officials, have not been implemented. As a result, these decades-old wounds have culminated in the recent redeclaration of ‘war’ by a coalition of fighters called the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) in September of this year.
Retaking Kidal – Victory Against Terrorists or Cause for Concern?
With the help of Russia’s Wagner Group mercenaries, Mali is taking a renewed stand against the internal violence that has plagued its northern countryside for decades. Additionally, Malian officials have since put forth claims of mass graves discovered in Kidal. If true, this would only further justify the military’s operations in the region, granting the Malian state moral and political justification to launch attacks on other Tuareg strongholds.
At the time of writing, these accusations have yet to be substantiated by the Malian armed forces. The lack of concrete evidence of these mass graves has led to criticism from Tuareg groups, especially given its convenient timing with rumours of new mass-killings of civilians by Wagner mercenaries. Regardless of what accusations are truthful, there are concerns that such a serious accusation could be a political maneuver by the Malian government in order to give themselves license to attack Tuareg-controlled areas.
Furthermore, another consequence of these accusations could be a further blurring of the lines distinguishing between Tuareg rebels and extremist ISIS-affiliated groups. Failing to distinguish between the two groups could harm legitimate negotiations and empower extremist Islamist groups in the area, even though they have aligned on occasion.
Amid escalating violence in 2023, there is precedent for concern: in the 2012 uprising, there have been reports that non-combatant Tuareg populations in the north of the country are being forced to flee by Malian forces. Not only are there Tuareg individuals who have chosen not to take arms against Malian authorities and face collective punishment for the actions of these rebel groups, but the Tuareg people are also not the only ethnic group who inhabit northern Mali. Significant populations of Fula, Songhay, and other groups populate the same sparsely populated deserts of northern Mali claimed by Azawad separatists, further complicating attempts to universalize or simplify this conflict.
The Importance of Precise Labelling in Mali’s Conflict
The Malian conflict can be seen through various viewpoints. For one, it can be framed within the global ‘war on terror,’ with Mali’s fight against jihadist factions at the forefront of counter-terrorism efforts within the Sahel region. This story can also be viewed within the context of West Africa’s recent coups and formation of an ‘anti-imperialist bloc’, where countries have begun rejecting long-standing ties with former colonizer France and accepting assistance in tackling internal unrest from other countries like Russia and China.
However, these dominant frames oversimplify the conflict and fail to acknowledge the legitimate concerns of the Tuareg, who remain an underrepresented population in media coverage of this regional conflict. Labels like ‘Islamist violence’ or simply just ‘terrorism’ reduce both the diversity of actors as well as the agency of those who are seeking greater autonomy. While terrorism accurately describes some of the patterns of violence by armed insurgents and especially potential mass graves, it may also shut down any conversations about the Tuareg’s concerns.
The labels and rhetoric used has tangible effects on the outcome of this conflict: Mali’s negotiations with rebels continue to break down and the mere mention of a ceasefire is causing a diplomatic row between the Algerian and Malian governments. Armed groups have withdrawn from peace talks not for chaos nor violence, but due to these unkept promises. Rather than continue with a deeply flawed ceasefire, they seek to negotiate in a “neutral country and under international mediation.”
Forward Towards Dialogue and Greater Tuareg Autonomy
Kidal has been retaken, but at what cost? The Malian army’s operations are continuing, negotiations with rebels have been unsuccessful, and diplomatic disputes are becoming common. At this point, a mediated peace for the Tuareg seems distant. In seeking solutions to the Malian conflict, it will be vital for outside actors to distinguish between the different parties involved. Future negotiations and media coverage must engage in nuanced dialogues with armed groups, avoiding labels like “Islamist” or “terrorist.” Failing to do so risks sidelining and delegitimizing a conflict that has persisted for decades in relative silence.
Regardless of the legitimacy of some groups’ methods or their separatist claims, the Tuareg face ongoing denial of autonomy by the Malian government, violence from jihadists and state actors, and remain a stateless group of people whose language, culture, and way of life are broadly unrecognized not just in Mali, but in the wider region.
Edited by Majeed Malhas
